Why Iran’s Reformists are down, but not out

As Iranians head to the polls on July 5 to elect the country’s next president, in my latest analysis for Amwaj.media, I take a closer look at the campaign strategies, rhetoric, and stated plans of the Reformists to explain why the movement is struggling to satisfy its base—the core of which has historically been made up of the white-collar middle class, college students, urban workers, and women who seek greater representation and social freedoms.

Iran held snap presidential elections on June 28, following the May 19 death of Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash. After the vote, two leading contenders emerged—Reformist Masoud Pezeshkian and hardliner Saeed Jalili. Neither secured the required majority of votes to declare an outright victory. So, constituents will head to the polls again on July 5 to decide between the two candidates and their widely differing approaches toward social justice, the economy, and foreign policy.

As demonstrated by the record-low turnout of 40% in the first round of voting, the two political camps—particularly the Reformists—did not manage to reignite zeal for change through the ballot box, continuing a downward trend seen in the 2021 presidential and Mar. 2024 parliamentary elections.

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Raisi, the Presidency, and Iran's Foreign Policy

Amid ongoing debates about Iran’s President Ebrahim Raisi and his foreign policy approach, I'm excited to share my latest for the United States Institute of Peace's Iran Primer. I aim to shed light on the convoluted and often long process of consensus-building between the maze of foreign policymaking entities and power structures in the country.

Iran is ruled by an autocratic form of government, but that does not mean that the Supreme Leader simply issues decrees, and everyone falls in line. In developing policy, an often-long process of consensus-building happens within a maze of entities and power structures. Ideological factions are seldom in agreement on any issue, including foreign policy, which adds another layer of political intrigue. The political environment is highly contested, and alliances shift constantly. Personal and institutional rivalries play a huge role as well. The institutional power of various entities also changes based on the individual in charge, so determining who holds the greatest sway is not a simple calculation.

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Reforms Cannot Be Killed

Ebrahim Raisi won Iran’s thirteenth presidential election with 61.9 percent of the vote. This is a major victory for the hardliners, but contributing factors such as disarray among reformists need to be better contextualized. I also want to push back on the dominant doom and gloom narrative that is perpetuated in the Western media these days. The Guardian Council ensured Raisi's victory by disqualifying all major reformist and moderate candidates from the get-go, but reformists' agency cannot be discounted. Their disillusionment and lack of a cohesive approach further facilitated the hardliner's victory.

Reformists spent significant time and energy debating the participation issue in an election cycle that was already shortened due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Various consensus building attempts fell short until a few days before the vote, which left little time for mobilization. The increasing gap between the reformists and street-level politics played a major negative role as well. For the past five years, they gradually lost touch with the pressing needs of the middle and lower class Iranians. They backed Rouhani in 2013 and 2017, but they did not have any robust or cohesive response to his shortcomings. Their silence was especially noticeable on issues related to the economy and people's day-to-day livelihood, which significantly regressed after Trump's maximum pressure policy against Iran. The reformists also did not manage to rejuvenate their movement by nurturing a new generation of political leaders, which forced them to fall back on trite tactics and old faces, further disillusioning the voters.

There are other factors involved that will be analyzed for months to come. However, for now, there is a pervasive narrative of doom and gloom that's not situated within the historical realities of Iran. Raisi's victory is certainly a setback for moderate and reformist camps, but it's not predictive of some kind of a political doomsday in Iran. There needs to be a distinction made between the reformists as a political faction and the concept of reforms.

If history is any guide, so far, it's been impossible to kill bottom-up politics and reforms. That's not how state-society dynamics work! There is no permanent destruction of ideas or social forces. Iran is no exception and its history demonstrates it. The country has experienced a rich 100-year timeline of reforms that began with the 1906 Constitutional Revolution and have continued to the present day. This historical arc hasn't been a smooth curve. It's been a jagged line dotted with countless setbacks and state repression. The power and role of various political fronts have ebbed and flowed, but the ability of various bottom-up forces to retain pressure on them as well as the state has also been a permanent feature.

Today was a defeat for reformists, but the struggle is ongoing with many more battles ahead. It may seem impossible now, but Iran's civil society will find alternative ways to retain its pressure on various state bodies and political factions, demanding socipololitical and economic reforms. It seems the reformists have been abandoned by the voters at this moment in time, but this may be the exact wakeup-call needed to alter their approach. If not, the civil society can always find alternatives to communicate its demands and exert its power on the state.

Yes, Iranians Can Protest Against Both US Intervention and Their Government

In my latest article for the Guardian, I argue that the complex attitudes of Iranian protesters are surprising only to those who see the country as a monolith. They have accepted the superficial caricature of a nation in which there can only be one national mood.

“Protests erupted in Iran soon after the government admitted to having accidentally shot down a passenger plane killing 176 people. That disaster took place amid escalating tensions with the US over the killing of Qassem Suleimani, head of the country’s powerful Quds force. The crowds have called on their supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, to step down, and security forces have responded with teargas, rubber bullets and even live ammunition. In one of the most visceral displays of anger so far, a young man climbed up a billboard depicting Suleimani. After making it to the top, he kicked the picture and eventually dragged it down. The apparent shift in the public’s attitude towards its government has puzzled some observers. Just a week ago, Iranians appeared to be united in mourning the loss of a revered general but today they are taking to the streets against the ruling elite.”

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Iranians Use Humor to Cope with Trump

In my latest piece for Al-Monitor, I argue that for Iranians, humor is a form of psychological processing—a coping mechanism to deal with dark scenarios. Iran’s past is fraught with such grim realities, and this, perhaps, is the secret to the population’s unwavering wit and reliance on humor during challenging times.

“Facing unprecedented pressure from US sanctions, the threat of war and a failing national currency, Iranians have resorted to a time-tested coping mechanism: a deadpan, caustic humor that has been perfected over centuries. US President Donald Trump, the usual target of Iran’s self-referential humor, was once again a target earlier this month. On May 9, Trump, in response to a reporter’s question about a potential military confrontation with Iran, stated, “I don’t want to say no, but hopefully that won’t happen…What I’d like to see with Iran, I’d like to see them call me.” This curious phrasing about a nuanced process prompted the hashtag allô-Trump on Iranian social media, with humorous memes and videos poking fun at the implausibility of the suggestion. The next day, media reported that the White House had provided a phone number to the Swiss Embassy — America’s protective power in Iran — in case Tehran wants to call to ease the tensions. This reportedly prompted hundreds of prank calls to Switzerland’s diplomatic mission.”

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Humor Prevails in Iran

The threat of war and existing sanctions continue to greatly impact the everyday life of Iranians. There are many reports of high inflation, shortage of essential items, and potential rationing of food. Through all these pressures, one constant variable has been the population’s unrelenting sense of humor. There are countless jokes about corruption, Donald Trump, regime officials, and the daily challenges of life. A somewhat recent example is a short clip by Arzhang Amirfazli, a popular TV comedian and actor. In a minute-long clip published on social media, he does an incredible job to summarize the prevailing conditions of day-to-day life in Iran. I translated the short clip and I hope the sharp wit of its creator is not lost the process.

“The conditions of our everyday life: It got disconnected? Mhm. They cut it off? Mhm. It went up? It ran out? It totally disappeared? Uh-huh. It got eliminated? Mhm. Oh, so it’s no longer imported? Uh-huh. It’s no longer exported either? They took it? They removed it? Eh, they are no longer here? Hh-huh. It’s banned now?  They embezzled it? Mmm. So, it’s no longer possible? They stole it and polished it off with a cold glass of water? Uh-huh. It’s contraband now?  It’s prohibited. Mhm. They eradicated it? Uh-huh. They don’t give it anymore? Uh-huh. It’s very expensive now? Mhm. I shouldn’t even think about it anymore? Uh-huh. I can’t see it? Uh-huh. I can’t eat it? Mhm. And those we can’t even take anymore? Huh-huh. These we can’t hit anymore? Mhm. No! No! We don’t have any needs. It’s not important that you don’t have that. If this is not available then it’s not! No problem. We don’t need that either. There are no issues about this one either. It’s not here, so what? No problem. No! No! We don’t want this either. It was here until now, but it’s not here anymore. What can we do? We are used to it. No, I don’t want it. That one? I don’t want that either. No, we don’t want this either. We don’t need it. No problem! No!”

The Anatomy Of A Revolution

In my latest piece for LobeLog, I argue that the fluid reality of the Islamic Republic creates a confusing environment for players and observers alike. Yesterday’s unthinkable actions may be considered prudent today, and influential political figures of the past can easily be debilitated by a pervasive opposing faction in the future. While analyzing the often-unpredictable system in Iran, it is crucial to remember that revolution, in the mind of its founders and citizens, is not an event with a definite start and end date. It is an ongoing process and any conclusive summary would impose an arbitrary closure on a continuous evolution.

“Iran is celebrating the anniversary of its 1979 Revolution this month. Just as with the previous 40 years, an army of experts will attempt to dissect the exact nature of the Islamic Republic, its achievements, and a proverbial laundry list of its shortcomings. Akin to performing an autopsy, scholars will poke and prod at every organ in an attempt to shed light on various pathological features of the system. Some will forget that the body on the table is still alive, though the patient is still breathing and evolving despite its ailments. After close examination, analysts will emphatically provide their own prescriptions for the best path forward. The reality of Iran’s ruling system, however, is too abstract to fit squarely into any black-and-white diagnosis.”

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Iran Vs. Iran

Iran continues to be a baffling country to the uninitiated—heck, it's pretty bewildering even to the most seasoned observers! I came across two seemingly contradicting articles yesterday, which made me ponder Iran's complex dynamics for the umpteenth time. A profile in the Financial Times celebrated Laya Joneydi, a 50-year-old Iranian academic, who is a woman “with no ties to conventional politicians and no personal stories from Iran’s revolutionary years.” But, she currently serves as Iran’s vice-president for legal affairs. The second article published by Al-Monitor speaks about the horrible ordeal of Niloufar Bayani, an environmental activist who has been in prison with no access to a lawyer of her choosing for over a year. During her second court appearance, Bayani told the judge that her “statements to interrogators were given under duress and that she had been threatened and tortured.”

Some women are allowed to climb positions of power and others are tortured for their aim to secure a better future for Iran. Some are praised for their Western education and promoted for their resolve and others are shunned for having Western ideologies. There are those who can talk against the forced hejab and be relatively OK doing so, and there are others who are pushed out of the country for protesting against numerous injustices. The list of such contradictions can fill a 1000-page book. But, are there no set laws?

Sure, Iran has laws, but they are applied in arbitrary ways, which creates a confusing environment for all. Legal actions of yesterday, may be considered illegal today or a similar activity may or may not be a prosecutable offense depending on the context in which it is carried on. Who does what is very important too. Who did it? When was it done? How was it done? Why was it done? (Or the perception of why it was done for that matter) can completely change the reaction of the powers that be (which could also be fluid) towards the offender. Being close to the power centers or a connected family buys you some immunity, but you are not untouchable either. Major political figures including former presidents manage to fall out of favor with the deep state, which guarantees them being sidelined or much worse.

In case of Iran, there are always more questions than answers. Is it an authoritarian regime incapable of tolerating change? Is it a theocracy that is reforming, albeit slowly and painfully? Does the system hate everything Western? Are limited freedoms only allowed to insiders? Answers to these questions and many more are never as simple as a yes or no, but a variation of grey in between. In case of Iran's sociopolitical dynamics, I have always been weary of people with emphatic black-and-white answers. The country's reality is much more abstract.

Iranians Vent Anger at Rich and Powerful

During the early 1990s many children of Iran’s political elite emerged as young men of means and influence. They were quickly labeled as the aghazadeh—a term used to refer to individuals with royal families. This phenomenon gave further credence to the popular notion that the elite are the ones that unfairly benefit from the theocratic regime. Issues such as unfair distribution of wealth and cronyism have existed since the early days of the Iranian Revolution, but with today's prominence of social media, these realities are witnessed by the masses in a much more ubiquitous fashion. The rich lives of the elite and their statements about their good fortune are plastered all over the Internet, which creates an enduring echo chamber. A recent example is the comments made by Hamid Reza Aref, the son of former Vice President Mohammad Reza Aref that led to the creation of the popular #goodgenes hashtag that protests nepotism and elitism. The young Aref attributed his business success to his "good genes."

The current government in Iran is certainly sensitive to criticism and aware that it cannot remain silent in the face of public outrage. Rouhani has been a constant supporter of plans to fight government corruption and has made it his public mission to combat any exploitive behaviors. However, Rouhani’s administration, similar to any other government, needs to be pressured, monitored, and held accountable by the public. After the controversial appointment of Rouhani’s son-in-law to the head of Iran’s Geological Survey and the intense public criticism that followed, Kambiz Mehdizadeh stepped down from his position. Mehdizadeh's resignation indicates that despite rampant nepotism, when faced with public scrutiny, the government is still forced to respond.

In my comments to The Washington Post, I indicate that the dire economic conditions in Iran have bred extraordinary resentment toward corruption, nepotism, and the aghazadeh-ha who seem immune to the country’s topsy-turvy realities.

Commentator's Emotional Broadcast Captures Iran's Victorious Moment

The world of soccer is full of memorable commentary from the game's energetic broadcasters. At times, the announcers' colorful words are what the fans remember long after they forgot the details of a key play or an important victory. Iran’s historic 2018 World Cup win against Morocco was not an exception. The wonderful broadcast of Iran’s beloved soccer commentator Adel Ferdosipour appears to have struck a positive chord within the country.

Moments of collective public celebrations are rare for any nation, but there are especially scarce in Iran. The country has endured almost 40 years of international isolation as well as restrictive social policies that hamper public displays of revelry. Ferdosipour's emphatic shouts of "take in the pleasure" and "enjoy" sound much sweeter within that context. His broadcast was emotional, honest, and more importantly, managed to capture the collective public emotion. 

It would be a shame not to have a record of Ferdosipour’s announcement in English, so I translated the last four minutes of the broadcast.

"Ehsan [Hajsafi] sends in the free kick…GOAL! In the net! Did Mehdi Taremi score or was it an own goal? Goal for Iran. Minute 95 their goal opens. How much did we enjoy this! Joonam* (my life) Mr. Bouhaddouz! I think it was an own goal by Aziz Bouhaddouz. The first own goal of the Cup results in our 1-0 victory. 1-0 for Iran. Look at these fans. Take in this pleasure. Enjoy. You see Carlos Queiroz. Minute 95 the result is 1-0. Mehdi Torabi was there. Let’s see Ehsan Hajsafi’s excellent cross. What a good and beautiful own goal! We are watching this together. A diving header. A ball that Aziz Bouhaddouz places in their own goal. Joonam Queiroz! How good is this team? How good are these boys? How much are we enjoying this? 

1-0 for Iran. Our second victory in the history of the World Cup. The history of the Iranian soccer will not forget these 90 minutes. Mr. Cakir* should blow the [final] whistle! The ball comes to the left. A cross by Achraf Hakimi. Ya Ali!* And it’s caught! Caught. Rouzbeh [Cheshmi] says it’s over! Ramin [Rezaeian] says it’s over! And it’s over for real! It’s over for real! Congratulations to all of you! What an eidi* (gift) they gave us, these players. What good boys we have! How beautiful and dear are they? How much did we enjoy this? A sweet victory. A memorable victory. Three valuable points. Saint Petersburg becomes eternal for us. This team deserves any type of praise and compliment. The entire world is forced to remember Iran. Beiranvand had a clean sheet like Alireza Haghighi. He is our second goalkeeper to have a [World Cup] clean sheet. An own goal resulted in our victory."

*Iranians typically refer to their loved ones as their "jan" or their life. Also, if used in reaction or reference to a pleasurable moment it can express joy to its utmost degree.

*Turkey's Cüneyt Çakır was the referee of the game.

*Iranians practicing Shia Islam often call on Imam Ali in moments of peril. Ali was the cousin and the son-in-law of Muhammad, the prophet of Islam. He ruled as the fourth caliph from 656 to 661.

*Eidi is a gift that is usually given by elder relatives and family friends as part of the celebration of Muslim holidays. The game coincided with Eid al-Fitr, an important religious holiday that marks the end of Ramadan, the Islamic month of fasting.

Iran Brags About Its World Cup Chances

Soccer fans everywhere are counting down the days in anticipation of the 2018 FIFA World Cup in Russia, a truly international event that happens every four years. The competition starts on June 14 and Iran will not be left behind this year. After a long and arduous road, the country has qualified for its 5th appearance. Many of you will be cheering on Iran’s national team (Team Melli) as they face one of the toughest groups in the World Cup that includes Morocco (June 15th), Spain (June 20th), and Portugal (June 25th). However, the country’s unwavering fans do not seem to be intimidated by the impressive resume of their opponents and count on their team to shock the world.

In a music video, produced by a group of talented Iranian musicians, comedians, and puppeteers, the fans are challenging the likes of Portugal’s Cristiano Ronaldo and Spain’s Sergio Ramos to an unforgettable match. What makes this video my personal favorite, is a perfect mix of childhood nostalgia, respect for past players, country’s love of soccer, and a comical level of bravado. The music video is further perfected by its inclusion of the Bandari music style—a rhythmic type of dance music played in fast and slow tempos mainly in Southern Iran.

Do not be confused by the purple puppet! That’s Jenab Khan, a puppet character that makes frequent appearances on Iran’s popular nightly comedy show called Khandevane. The puppet is a big football fan and has actually claimed to be the owner of Paris Saint-Germain F.C. I translated the song for the fans who may struggle to understand the lyrics, especially the fast rhythm of the hip-hop portion. The video includes some esoteric local references, which I try to explain at the bottom of the post.

Here's to an incredible World Cup for all, especially for Iran’s Cheetahs!

Where in the world with a two-layered plastic ball*
On a shadow-less asphalt [field]
One person shoeless, one with sandals
Challenge each other to a nutmeg (through the legs) contest?

Where in the world the goalpost is a bucket?
The double cut move is ours, brother! You get it?
The just winner on the asphalt street
[Kicks] all three corners and a penalty
We’ve battled (dribbled) the street soccer groupings
Don’t frighten us of Cris Ronaldo!

Where else in the world have you seen shoot-e yek zarb*?
Have you ever made a cut with a two-layered ball?
He dies after an ACL tear!
Have you ever experienced knee effusion?
They’d broadcast from Channel One
The movie, Victory
But, it was us that after Rocky’s dive
Would dive on a dirt field
These scars on our arms weren’t gained on the cheap
Don’t frighten us of de Gea’s saves!

[Chorus] We are the ones that would hit the gum pics with our hands*
We have tasted the difficult times
We want to be the posters on the walls of your homes
Those days are over and we’ve grown

Who are their big ones? Ramos and Castán?
They wouldn't be an issue for our kids
Their dribblers are Isco and Alba?
They’ll both eat Ashkan’s slide [tackles]
Don’t say that Sergio Busquets is in the middle
Our legionnaires* will humiliate them
Our apologies, the scoreboard below up
It’s the hand throws of Beiranvand
Our team is well-versed in destroying opponents
If not, cake and drinks on us!

[Chorus] We are the ones that would hit the gum pictures with our hands
We have tasted the difficult times
We want to be the posters on the walls of your homes
Those days are over and we’ve grown

[Bandari portion]

Neymar Junior! Neymar!

Neymar…Neymar…we’ve come to Russia!
What a nightmare is Iran for you
Neymar…Neymar…we’ve come to Russia!
What a nightmare is Iran for you

Listen to my warning, remember what I said
Listen to my warning, remember what I said
Neymar, all of a sudden, we may sweep you up!
Neymar, all of a sudden, we may sweep you up!

[Chorus] Neymar…Neymar…we’ve come to Russia!
What a nightmare is Iran for you

Vey…mashallah…mashallah
Score one more!
Vey…mashallah…mashallah
Score one more!
…mashallah…mashallah
Score one more!
…mashallah…mashallah
Score one more!
…
We’ll meg Iniesta in a way that he wouldn't even know where it came from!
...mashallah…mashallah
Mohamed Salah, what do you think?
Ya…mashallah…mashallah
We are just missing Ebrahim Tahami on the team!
Ya…mashallah…mashallah
My life, Ahmad Abedzadeh!

Hey..hey..hey..hey..hey..hey..hey..hey
Hey..hey..hey..hey..hey..hey..hey..hey...

*This is a soft plastic ball sold at every cornerstone for a very cheap price in Iran. It is used for playing soccer by kids in the streets. It does not need to be inflated because the shell is a hard plastic layer that holds in the air, but at the same time it is too soft to play with in the streets without denting or piercing the outer shell. That is why kids buy two of them, tear one halfway open and wrap it around the second ball. As such, the ball becomes heavier and much harder to damage on the rough street surface. Almost every child in Iran has played with one. The image coincides with a strong sense of nostalgia and also reminds the older generation of the lack of available equipment for youth in the country.

*A simple street game that usually takes place between two players. The goals are made out of bricks, school backpacks, or any other random objects lying around. The two players stand in their respective goals and try to score against one another by kicking the ball towards each other’s goals. Each player is allowed one kick and no rebounds.

*During the 80s and 90s, the Aideen company produced a series of chewing gum that contained pictures of renowned soccer players. The goal was to collect as many as you could. It was hard to collect all the pictures and often times you'd get a lot of repeats, so a game was created by kids to exchange the pictures in a fair way. You would lay the pictures down, often on top of one another, and hit it hard with your hand. If the pictures flipped as a result of your hit, you would win the pictures you turned. The individual you played would get the same opportunity with the pictures you volunteered for the game.

*Iranians refer to players that play for foreign clubs during the year, but join the national team for international games as legionnaires.

Trump Vs. The Iran Deal

The story of Trump's war against the Iran Deal vis-a-vis international law, order, and institutions could be a case study against populist leaders and populism. Iran's Ahmadinejad attempted to do the same by calling international agreements "nothing but a bunch of ripped up paper." Then he proceeded to introduce his own “global management plan.” Why follow the established norms when you can rebuild the world in your own image? Trump’s hubris and disregard for international agreements is not unlike Ahmadinejad or other populist leader’s perception of the world. As stated by former US negotiator Richard Nephew, Trump would likely renegotiate and sign a worse deal if it was called the Trump Iran Deal!

Just think about the amount of energy and resources spent on dismantling the JCPOA, an international agreement that is working according to worldwide consensus. For what? That is perhaps the nature of populism. It’s based on reactionary thinking and offering quick fixes aimed at appeasing the masses. The great irony this time around is that the masses supporting Trump were riled up by Trump himself who is now offering a fix to a deal that is not broken.

In the short term that may work. Populist leaders may manage to bully their opposition around and strong-arm their worldview on other countries by threats or offering incentives when needed, but it’s only a matter of time before the whole scheme falls apart. As a matter of fact, thus far, European leaders seem to not be budging and remain determined to implement the agreement.

You only have to look at the fate of populist leaders in Iran or Latin American countries to see how quickly they manage to lose support. Populists thrive on demonizing the "other." They always look to find internal and external enemies to blame in order to extend their survival. Populists exploit fear and reject criticism from even their closest allies. The JCPOA and Iran are those external boogeymen for now (something not unique to the current US administration). However, eventually, all populist leaders, including Trump, will lose popular support since nationalistic and protectionist policies, more often than not, leave the country in tatters. This is a pattern history has demonstrated over and over again.

What We Don't Know About Protests in Iran

For the past five days, Iran has been experiencing country-wide protests. Early reports indicate that the conservative opponents of president Rouhani’s moderate government organized public demonstrations in the city of Mashhad—the second largest city in the country and a prominent destination for Shia pilgrims. The gathering was initially organized to protest high prices, the government’s inability to control inflation, as well as other socioeconomic concerns. However, it soon spread out of control and became much broader in its demands. Some slogans went as far as targeting the Supreme Leader and the Islamic Republic as a whole. The geographical spread and the radical nature of some chants has surprised many, including the country’s political factions. As always, Iran’s forever shifting dynamics has forced the majority of politicians and analysts to take a big juicy bite of humble pie. Some are refusing to eat the proverbial baked good, but the majority of fair-minded observers agree that there are many unknowns at this point and jumping into any broad conclusions is imprudent.

In my humble opinion, there could even be some clarity in uncertainty, so laying out the facts, as best as we can, may shed some light on the situation at hand. The causes of the protests are not monolithic. They range from a broad series of socioeconomic and political concerns—many rooted in the society’s ongoing historic calls for social justice and accountability. The geographic spread is significant, but not necessarily determinative of any additional outcomes. Reports indicate that unrest is dissipating, but the exact trajectory of demonstrators who may not heed the government’s calls for restraint is unclear. It is not evident if this is a movement or just sporadic expressions of rage. There does not appear to be a leader for the protests and no political faction or opposition group (external or internal) has thus far been willing to own them.

Both reformist and conservative wings of Iran’s political factions seem surprised and have yet to land on any coherent approach. In his televised address to the cabinet, President Rouhani recognized the right of people to protest, however he failed to even hint at the institutional constraints and the system’s inability to provide adequate venues for expressing discontent. Conservatives seem to support any calls that suggest Rouhani’s mismanagement of the country’s economy, but are taken back by those who are attacking the Supreme Leader. Reformists who until a few days ago were boasting about their ability to read the pulse of the public are surprised by the extent of the protests and, needless to say, unwilling to support radical demands. In my opinion, these protests will have some ramifications when it comes to the realignment of the position of Iran’s political factions vis-a-vis the issues and their internal dynamics, but the extent of that is unclear as of now.

It is also important to point out that protests in Iran are not unprecedented. The history of the Islamic Republic is fraught with big and small public demonstrations related to the government’s inability to control prices, equal distribution of wealth, lack of social freedoms, human rights, and an array of political issues. Thus far the regime has managed to control public unrest by implementing policy changes or using force when necessary. As of right now, we do not have any indication that would suggest that this time around is anything different. Just to be clear, my aim is not to dismiss public frustrations or belittle people’s genuine demands. As long as public grievances remain and the regime does not provide the necessary outlets for expressing discontent and institutionalizing reform, protests will happen. Though unlikely, we can only hope that this time around regime officials will listen to the calls for justice and implement lasting change.

Trump's State Department Is Not Equipped To Implement His Middle East Agenda

As someone who has been working on Middle East related issues for the past 10 years, I am deeply concerned with the way Trump's administration is crafting and implementing its policy towards the region. It is very difficult to make that point without sounding like a melodramatic alarmist, but the situation is dire.

Within the first six months of his term, Trump has decertified the Iran deal; has increased US support for Saudi Arabia’s intervention in Yemen; increased deployments of special operation forces in Syria to challenge Iranian militias; and backed Riyadh’s attempt to practically take the Lebanese Prime Minister hostage. Yesterday's news of the US's decision to recognize Jerusalem as Israel's capital will further fan the flames in an already explosive region. Clearly, Trump has decided to pursue a very aggressive Middle East policy to say the least. So what? That may not be a bad thing if executed properly.

You may argue that the aforementioned moves are a part of a calculated plan and can easily be justified and coordinated by the State Department or diplomats on the ground. You may say, the president's agenda is aggressive, but it will actually further US interests in the Middle East. But, who will be in charge of implementing it? The State Department will play a major role, of course!

There lies the additional major problem. The State Department is debilitated and appears to be very understaffed and ill-prepared to implement such an aggressive regional agenda. According to a recent Time report, the US has lost 60% of its career ambassadors since January. Quoting a tally by the American Foreign Service Association, a New York Times report stated that the number of those with the department’s top two ranks of career ambassador and career minister will have been cut in half by December 1, from 39 to 19. Of the 431 minister-counselors, 369 remain and another 14 have indicated that they will leave soon. So far, just 10 of the top 44 political positions in the department have been filled. The dearth of seasoned diplomats is particularity problematic when it comes to the Middle East. Currently the US has no ambassadors to Jordan, Turkey, Egypt, Qatar, or Saudi Arabia. Needless to say, US has no diplomatic relations with Iran and has closed its embassies in Syria and Yemen. Back in DC, there is still no assistant secretary of state for near eastern affairs. Jonathan Stevenson's post for the International Institute for Strategic Studies further elaborates on the lack of supervisory experience and expertise back in Washington.

Trump is pursuing a very provocative agenda without much diplomatic capacity to actually implement it. The "sitting on a powder keg" analogy does not even work here, since many parts of the region are already on fire.

The Impact of New U.S. Sanctions on The IRGC

The impact of the US designation of the IRGC as a terrorist organization depends on the Trump administration's ultimate implementation mechanism. Will the US hinder IRGC's financial dealings or confront it militarily as a terrorist entity akin to ISIS or Al-Qaeda? If the Trump administration is considering the former, the impact on IRGC's activities will be relatively minor. There have been various US Treasury sanctions imposed against the IRGC since 2007, but Iran's paramilitary force has managed to operate effectively regardless.

However, it is a different story if the aim is to treat the IRGC and its external special forces--the Qods force--as a terrorist organization. US troops in Iraq, Afghanistan, or other parts of the region may be forced to confront the Qods force in combat, a move that will not go unanswered by Iran. The IRGC Commander has already stated that if the news of the potential terrorist designation is correct, the Guard will reciprocate by considering "the American military all over the world, especially the Middle East, as equal to ISIS." This scenario presents an extreme amount of risk for both the IRGC and the US troops in the region.

Politically speaking, the IRGC will be the ultimate winner in Iran. Early signs indicate unanimous support for Iran's paramilitary force. President Rouhani who has often publicly criticized the IRGC for its involvement in the country's politics and the business sector announced his administration's support of the Guards. Also, the IRGC is currently enjoying a boost of popularity and public support. External threats such as ISIS, have resulted in public's acknowledgement of the entity's invaluable efforts to ensure Iran's security and territorial integrity. Any potential sanctions against the IRGC will unify the country's various political factions in opposing external pressures.

Why Is Rouhani Lashing Out?

The tone of president Hassan Rouhani's measured campaign is changing.  Within recent days, he has delivered rare criticisms of Iran's powerful religious and security forces, lashing out against rivals ahead of his reelection bid in less than 10 days.

To a certain extent, Rouhani’s attacks seem to be even harsher than his 2013 election strategy. For example, he even went as far as stating that the Shrine of Imam Reza—currently managed by Ebrahim Raisi—has avoided paying any taxes. Attacks against holy religious entities are typically considered to be off-limits. The reason behind this sudden shift is due to a number of factors:

1. Rouhani and Jahangiri were caught off-guard during the second debate

During the first debate, Jahangiri was responsible for the brunt of the attacks, mainly levied towards Ghalibaf. Rouhani picked up the pace a bit during the second debate by directly challenging Raisi’s experience, especially when it comes to foreign policy and Iran’s nuclear file. However, it was clear that Jahangiri-Rouhani were not prepared to deflect the majority of the Ghalibaf and Raisi's sharp attacks. For example, Rouhnai's education minister and his daughter were accused of corruption by Ghalibaf, but the moderate duo did not have a convincing rebuttal. Their lackluster performance left the moderate and reformist voices disappointed. They have called for a more robust approach by Rouhani.

2. Influential Conservative Forces Are Throwing Their Weight Behind Raisi

Since the second debate a number of major principlist organizations have officially endorsed Raisi as their candidate of choice. These insinuations have the ability of influencing the hearts and minds of the electorate, especially the country’s religious working class. Some of the major institutions that have publicly endorsed Raisi include the Resistance Front of Islamic Iran, an Iranian principlist political faction associated with Mohsen Rezaee, Society of Seminary Teachers of Qom, an influential body currently in charge of promoting or demoting clerical religious ranks, and Combatant Clergy Association, a traditional conservative clerical association.

Additionally, a number of hardline news agencies such as Tasnim, Keyhan, and Fars appear to be inching towards supporting Raisi. Within the past week, they have covered any news related to Raisi's campaign in a more nuanced and comprehensive manner. In order to combat these conservative heavyweights, Rouhani is forced to be much more direct and bold.

3. Furious Protests by Miners Could Indicate Rouhani’s Lack of Popularity within the Working Class

Over the weekend, Rouhani’s convoy faced furious protests by coal miners and their families when he visited the site of an explosion that claimed dozes of lives. Local news agencies broadcasted footage of people that surrounded Rouhani’s car, beating the vehicle and blocking its path. Rouhani’s promise of dealing with the situation did little to calm the crowd.

Just two weeks before the election, such footage could have an impact on public opinion, especially among the country’s blue-collar workers. The visit may have been a shocking revelation for Rouhani who may now believe to be losing popularity within the society's working class. His recent bombastic statements could be an attempt to combat such negative publicity.

It is clear that Rouhani is on full offensive mode and will adopt a no–holds–barred approach prior to the final debate. We should expect a very heated final debate over economic issues.

What Happened During Iran’s First Presidential Debate?

On April 28, Iran's state TV broadcasted the first of three presidential debates, which supposedly focused on social issues. The six candidates, however, were quick to turn the conversation into a heated battle over the country's economic conditions.

The hardline candidate Ebrahim Raisi clearly decided to stay calm and collected during the debate. He avoided any major confrontation with other candidates by sticking to his talking points and not talking out of turn. Regardless of the question, Raisi hammered the key populist policies of alleviating poverty, reducing unemployment, and providing government housing. He reminded the public of his religious devotion and sense of public service, referring to himself as a humble custodian of Imam Reza’s Shrine who has devoted his career to supporting the needy.

Raisi appeared as a sidelined candidate, considering the heated debate between Jahangiri and Ghalibaf that dominated a significant portion of the evening. Raisi also did not come off as a strong orator and spoke in a very calm clerical tone certainly not fit to energize the public.

Raisi has two more opportunities in the following debates to challenge other candidates and better detail his policy proposals. Raisi needs to intensify his rhetoric in order to pander to his hardline base who are expecting a more tenacious stance against Rouhani.

Compared to Raisi, Ghalibaf is a better-known political figure and technocrat with a long history of public service, so he has an established support base. Ghalibaf and Rouhani’s rivalry can also be stretched back to the last presidential debates where they had a number of intense exchanges on live television. Ghalibaf is an articulate and eloquent speaker and very knowledgeable about the nuances of public policy. This makes him a strong presidential contender that does not shy away from a confrontation.

Rouhani and Jahangiri's strategy of sparring with Ghalibaf certainly had an impact on sidelining Raisi. Iranian press has labeled the strategy as the "battle between shadow candidates." Jahangiri and Ghalibaf will do the heavy lifting and take the punches during the debates and will eventually drop out in favor of their faction's lead candidates. This strategy is much more accepted within the reformist camp, however it is still unclear if the conservatives are willing to fully embrace the approach. It is uncertain if Ghalibaf would be willing to eventually step aside in favor of Raisi.

Jahangiri and Rouhani did a much better job at addressing the questions in a more nuanced manner than the other candidates. They demonstrated their policy knowledge and understanding of the specific steps necessary to solve the country's problems.

It is very difficult to assess the impact of the first debate on the working class. Previous populist candidates like Mahmoud Ahmadinejad had a tremendous amount of success by appealing to the masses. Issues such as job creation, economic growth, inflation, and battling corruption, which were addressed most often by Raisi and Ghalibaf, remain to be the top priorities for blue collar Iranians.

We should not count Ghalibaf out of the presidential race. Despite Jahangiri and Rouhani’s challenges, he had a strong performance. He is an effective speaker and an experienced technocrat in tune with the country's issues. A number of conservative Iranians on social media actually declared Ghalibaf the winner of the first debate. They appreciated his boldness and tenacity in confronting Rouhani and Jahangiri. Ghalibaf went as far as printing the front page of Rouhani's website during the debate's 15-minute intermission to demonstrate Rouhani’s self-contradictions. He showed the page to the camera in order to prove that Rouhani had promised to create 4 million jobs before his election, a promise Rouhani tried to deny at the beginning of this debate.

Prior to the debate, the moderate and reformist camps were hesitant about their strategy of running a shadow candidate, so it was a pleasant surprise to witness Jahangiri's strong performance. He was willing to ‘take the punch’ for Rouhani in the face of Ghalibaf's tenacious attacks. He also demonstrated a very sharp mind when it comes to recalling statistics to back up his camp's claims. Iranians on social media have dubbed him as the nickname "Super Eshaq." There is a strong assumption that he will drop out of the race after the completion of the third debate. If he does not so, he will harm Rouhani by splitting the reformist-moderate votes.

America's Civil Society Is Alive and Well

My short interview in Farsi with BBC Persian amid the Washington DC protests against Trump's immigration ban.

"There are many present here protesting Trump's order despite the fact that it may not have a direct impact on their lives or family's lives. This demonstrates the awareness of America's civil society. [They know] that if the rights of a specific group is trampled and not protected it may result in future restriction of their own rights and freedoms."

E Pluribus Unum

Since Donald Trump's "Muslim Ban," I've received many messages of support from friends near and far. Your encouraging words mean the world to me. I will not for a second forget how lucky I am to have such an amazing group of people who have my back when the going gets tough. Your love energizes me, motivates me, and reminds me that I am not alone. I am forever grateful!

But, guess what? This is not about me. This is not about my family. This is not about Iranians or Muslims. This is about all of us who call this magnificent country home. Every single American who abides by the rule of law and order. Every single American who believes that law should govern the nation, as opposed to being governed by arbitrary decisions. Every single American who believes in the value of hard work and determination. Every single American who believes in the elusive American dream.

Trump’s seemingly impulsive and haphazard indefinite suspension of the resettlement of Syrian refugees and the "Muslim ban" challenges these values. It threatens our way of life. It makes a mockery of our tried and tested - albeit imperfect - immigration laws and procedures. It belittles the value of human life and dignity. It diminishes the value of logic, reason, and compassion. It makes a mockery of hundreds of thousands of immigrants who have been cleared to live in America under visas or permanent residencies.

In a few short hours after the ban, we witnessed the suffering of thousands of families who had legally earned their safe passage to the United States. Among them are grandparents waiting to see their loved ones. Children who miraculously survived the carnage in Syria. Medical or military professionals who have cared for us and saved American lives. Educators who have taught our children. Laborers who have produced goods and countless services. People who have served this country proudly, paid taxes, abided by laws and regulations, and been exemplary citizens. They believe in American values and contribute to the nation's prosperity. Trump's executive order is not just a "Muslim ban." It's a costly and ignorant decision that endangers our well-being as a nation and everything we hold dear.

So, I beg of you to do all you can to protect your way of life. I beg of you to protect your welfare. Stand up for your own right. March with passion. Organize local events. Sign petitions. Donate to civil rights organizations. Call your representatives. Call out bigotry. Call out hate. By standing up to injustice, you are protecting the collective good. You are securing a better life for all. You are ensuring a better tomorrow for your loved ones. This is our fight. This is our country. This is our future. E pluribus unum.

Rafsanjani Was Rafsanjani

Many experts are trying to label Hashemi Rafsanjani with certain factional affiliations or political leanings. Superfluous and heated debates are ongoing regarding Hashemi’s exact believes and moral compass. It is almost impossible to box him in because Rafsanjani was as dynamic and polylithic as the Islamic Republic. He was the Islamic Republic. Just like the system he lived to protect, he evolved, shed many skins (not all good), and adapted to numerous internal and external challenges. He set trends and acted as a dominant powerbroker for almost four decades. His fingerprints can be analyzed on every important dot on the Islamic Republic’s tumultuous timeline. Why attempt to fit an ocean in a cup? Rafsanjani was Rafsanjani. He was a phenomena in his own right and deserves comprehensive analyses for years to come.