Why Iran’s Reformists are down, but not out

As Iranians head to the polls on July 5 to elect the country’s next president, in my latest analysis for Amwaj.media, I take a closer look at the campaign strategies, rhetoric, and stated plans of the Reformists to explain why the movement is struggling to satisfy its base—the core of which has historically been made up of the white-collar middle class, college students, urban workers, and women who seek greater representation and social freedoms.

Iran held snap presidential elections on June 28, following the May 19 death of Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash. After the vote, two leading contenders emerged—Reformist Masoud Pezeshkian and hardliner Saeed Jalili. Neither secured the required majority of votes to declare an outright victory. So, constituents will head to the polls again on July 5 to decide between the two candidates and their widely differing approaches toward social justice, the economy, and foreign policy.

As demonstrated by the record-low turnout of 40% in the first round of voting, the two political camps—particularly the Reformists—did not manage to reignite zeal for change through the ballot box, continuing a downward trend seen in the 2021 presidential and Mar. 2024 parliamentary elections.

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Reforms Cannot Be Killed

Ebrahim Raisi won Iran’s thirteenth presidential election with 61.9 percent of the vote. This is a major victory for the hardliners, but contributing factors such as disarray among reformists need to be better contextualized. I also want to push back on the dominant doom and gloom narrative that is perpetuated in the Western media these days. The Guardian Council ensured Raisi's victory by disqualifying all major reformist and moderate candidates from the get-go, but reformists' agency cannot be discounted. Their disillusionment and lack of a cohesive approach further facilitated the hardliner's victory.

Reformists spent significant time and energy debating the participation issue in an election cycle that was already shortened due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Various consensus building attempts fell short until a few days before the vote, which left little time for mobilization. The increasing gap between the reformists and street-level politics played a major negative role as well. For the past five years, they gradually lost touch with the pressing needs of the middle and lower class Iranians. They backed Rouhani in 2013 and 2017, but they did not have any robust or cohesive response to his shortcomings. Their silence was especially noticeable on issues related to the economy and people's day-to-day livelihood, which significantly regressed after Trump's maximum pressure policy against Iran. The reformists also did not manage to rejuvenate their movement by nurturing a new generation of political leaders, which forced them to fall back on trite tactics and old faces, further disillusioning the voters.

There are other factors involved that will be analyzed for months to come. However, for now, there is a pervasive narrative of doom and gloom that's not situated within the historical realities of Iran. Raisi's victory is certainly a setback for moderate and reformist camps, but it's not predictive of some kind of a political doomsday in Iran. There needs to be a distinction made between the reformists as a political faction and the concept of reforms.

If history is any guide, so far, it's been impossible to kill bottom-up politics and reforms. That's not how state-society dynamics work! There is no permanent destruction of ideas or social forces. Iran is no exception and its history demonstrates it. The country has experienced a rich 100-year timeline of reforms that began with the 1906 Constitutional Revolution and have continued to the present day. This historical arc hasn't been a smooth curve. It's been a jagged line dotted with countless setbacks and state repression. The power and role of various political fronts have ebbed and flowed, but the ability of various bottom-up forces to retain pressure on them as well as the state has also been a permanent feature.

Today was a defeat for reformists, but the struggle is ongoing with many more battles ahead. It may seem impossible now, but Iran's civil society will find alternative ways to retain its pressure on various state bodies and political factions, demanding socipololitical and economic reforms. It seems the reformists have been abandoned by the voters at this moment in time, but this may be the exact wakeup-call needed to alter their approach. If not, the civil society can always find alternatives to communicate its demands and exert its power on the state.

Why Is Rouhani Lashing Out?

The tone of president Hassan Rouhani's measured campaign is changing.  Within recent days, he has delivered rare criticisms of Iran's powerful religious and security forces, lashing out against rivals ahead of his reelection bid in less than 10 days.

To a certain extent, Rouhani’s attacks seem to be even harsher than his 2013 election strategy. For example, he even went as far as stating that the Shrine of Imam Reza—currently managed by Ebrahim Raisi—has avoided paying any taxes. Attacks against holy religious entities are typically considered to be off-limits. The reason behind this sudden shift is due to a number of factors:

1. Rouhani and Jahangiri were caught off-guard during the second debate

During the first debate, Jahangiri was responsible for the brunt of the attacks, mainly levied towards Ghalibaf. Rouhani picked up the pace a bit during the second debate by directly challenging Raisi’s experience, especially when it comes to foreign policy and Iran’s nuclear file. However, it was clear that Jahangiri-Rouhani were not prepared to deflect the majority of the Ghalibaf and Raisi's sharp attacks. For example, Rouhnai's education minister and his daughter were accused of corruption by Ghalibaf, but the moderate duo did not have a convincing rebuttal. Their lackluster performance left the moderate and reformist voices disappointed. They have called for a more robust approach by Rouhani.

2. Influential Conservative Forces Are Throwing Their Weight Behind Raisi

Since the second debate a number of major principlist organizations have officially endorsed Raisi as their candidate of choice. These insinuations have the ability of influencing the hearts and minds of the electorate, especially the country’s religious working class. Some of the major institutions that have publicly endorsed Raisi include the Resistance Front of Islamic Iran, an Iranian principlist political faction associated with Mohsen Rezaee, Society of Seminary Teachers of Qom, an influential body currently in charge of promoting or demoting clerical religious ranks, and Combatant Clergy Association, a traditional conservative clerical association.

Additionally, a number of hardline news agencies such as Tasnim, Keyhan, and Fars appear to be inching towards supporting Raisi. Within the past week, they have covered any news related to Raisi's campaign in a more nuanced and comprehensive manner. In order to combat these conservative heavyweights, Rouhani is forced to be much more direct and bold.

3. Furious Protests by Miners Could Indicate Rouhani’s Lack of Popularity within the Working Class

Over the weekend, Rouhani’s convoy faced furious protests by coal miners and their families when he visited the site of an explosion that claimed dozes of lives. Local news agencies broadcasted footage of people that surrounded Rouhani’s car, beating the vehicle and blocking its path. Rouhani’s promise of dealing with the situation did little to calm the crowd.

Just two weeks before the election, such footage could have an impact on public opinion, especially among the country’s blue-collar workers. The visit may have been a shocking revelation for Rouhani who may now believe to be losing popularity within the society's working class. His recent bombastic statements could be an attempt to combat such negative publicity.

It is clear that Rouhani is on full offensive mode and will adopt a no–holds–barred approach prior to the final debate. We should expect a very heated final debate over economic issues.

What Happened During Iran’s First Presidential Debate?

On April 28, Iran's state TV broadcasted the first of three presidential debates, which supposedly focused on social issues. The six candidates, however, were quick to turn the conversation into a heated battle over the country's economic conditions.

The hardline candidate Ebrahim Raisi clearly decided to stay calm and collected during the debate. He avoided any major confrontation with other candidates by sticking to his talking points and not talking out of turn. Regardless of the question, Raisi hammered the key populist policies of alleviating poverty, reducing unemployment, and providing government housing. He reminded the public of his religious devotion and sense of public service, referring to himself as a humble custodian of Imam Reza’s Shrine who has devoted his career to supporting the needy.

Raisi appeared as a sidelined candidate, considering the heated debate between Jahangiri and Ghalibaf that dominated a significant portion of the evening. Raisi also did not come off as a strong orator and spoke in a very calm clerical tone certainly not fit to energize the public.

Raisi has two more opportunities in the following debates to challenge other candidates and better detail his policy proposals. Raisi needs to intensify his rhetoric in order to pander to his hardline base who are expecting a more tenacious stance against Rouhani.

Compared to Raisi, Ghalibaf is a better-known political figure and technocrat with a long history of public service, so he has an established support base. Ghalibaf and Rouhani’s rivalry can also be stretched back to the last presidential debates where they had a number of intense exchanges on live television. Ghalibaf is an articulate and eloquent speaker and very knowledgeable about the nuances of public policy. This makes him a strong presidential contender that does not shy away from a confrontation.

Rouhani and Jahangiri's strategy of sparring with Ghalibaf certainly had an impact on sidelining Raisi. Iranian press has labeled the strategy as the "battle between shadow candidates." Jahangiri and Ghalibaf will do the heavy lifting and take the punches during the debates and will eventually drop out in favor of their faction's lead candidates. This strategy is much more accepted within the reformist camp, however it is still unclear if the conservatives are willing to fully embrace the approach. It is uncertain if Ghalibaf would be willing to eventually step aside in favor of Raisi.

Jahangiri and Rouhani did a much better job at addressing the questions in a more nuanced manner than the other candidates. They demonstrated their policy knowledge and understanding of the specific steps necessary to solve the country's problems.

It is very difficult to assess the impact of the first debate on the working class. Previous populist candidates like Mahmoud Ahmadinejad had a tremendous amount of success by appealing to the masses. Issues such as job creation, economic growth, inflation, and battling corruption, which were addressed most often by Raisi and Ghalibaf, remain to be the top priorities for blue collar Iranians.

We should not count Ghalibaf out of the presidential race. Despite Jahangiri and Rouhani’s challenges, he had a strong performance. He is an effective speaker and an experienced technocrat in tune with the country's issues. A number of conservative Iranians on social media actually declared Ghalibaf the winner of the first debate. They appreciated his boldness and tenacity in confronting Rouhani and Jahangiri. Ghalibaf went as far as printing the front page of Rouhani's website during the debate's 15-minute intermission to demonstrate Rouhani’s self-contradictions. He showed the page to the camera in order to prove that Rouhani had promised to create 4 million jobs before his election, a promise Rouhani tried to deny at the beginning of this debate.

Prior to the debate, the moderate and reformist camps were hesitant about their strategy of running a shadow candidate, so it was a pleasant surprise to witness Jahangiri's strong performance. He was willing to ‘take the punch’ for Rouhani in the face of Ghalibaf's tenacious attacks. He also demonstrated a very sharp mind when it comes to recalling statistics to back up his camp's claims. Iranians on social media have dubbed him as the nickname "Super Eshaq." There is a strong assumption that he will drop out of the race after the completion of the third debate. If he does not so, he will harm Rouhani by splitting the reformist-moderate votes.